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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Appellant one-half 
of the proceeds from the sale of the parties' four-wheeler, but it instead awarded 
the entire proceeds from the sale to Appellee. STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Abuse of discretion. Dent v. Dent, 870 P.2d 280 (Utah 1994); Walters v. 
Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in holding Appellant in contempt for his 
sale of the parties' four-wheeler, because the parties reached a written stipulation 
after all parties were aware of the sale, which the Court approved by entering a 
Decree of Divorce consistent therewith, which only reserved the issue of offsets 
for sale and did not reserve any issue of contempt regarding the sale. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Inasmuch as this issue depends on an interpretation 
of the legal effect on the issues reserved for trial of the Court approving the 
parties' stipulation and entering a Decree, it presents a question of law, which the 
appellate court reviews for correctness. Office of Recovery Servs. v. V.G.P.. 845 
P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992). 
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3. Whether the trial court erred in holding Appellant in contempt for his 
failure to make timely mortgage payments, because the parties reached a written 
stipulation after all parties were aware of the failure to timely make mortgage 
payments, which the Court approved by entering a Decree of Divorce consistent 
therewith, which only reserved the issue of judgment for the unpaid payments did 
not reserve any issue of contempt regarding the wrongful failure to timely make 
mortgage payments. STANDARD OF REVIEW: Inasmuch as this issue depends 
on an interpretation of the legal effect on the issues reserved for trial of the Court 
approving the parties' stipulation and entering a Decree, it presents a question of 
law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Office of Recovery Servs. 
v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in requiring Appellant to pay Appellee's 
attorney's fees without adequate findings and because each party had as much 
ability to pay as the other (in context of the Court's retroactive equalization of the 
parties'standard of living). STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. 
Kerr v.Kerr, 651 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980). 
5. Whether the trial court erred in entering judgment against Appellant 
for the proceeds of sale of the parties' four-wheeler, after Appellant had obtained 
a discharge in bankruptcy on this non-support debt. STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Inasmuch as this issue depends on an interpretation of the effect of federal 
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bankruptcy law on state court divorce proceedings, it presents a question of law, 
which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Office of Recovery Servs. v. 
V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992); See also, Durham v. Duchesne 
County, 893 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1995). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The following statutes, ordinances and rules are determinative in this 
appeal and their entire text is set forth verbatim in the addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-3(1), 30-3-5(1), 78-2a-3(2)(h), 78-31-1(5) 
Title 11, United States Code §§ 524, 727(b) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the exercise of rights and obligations between spouses in 
a divorce case. It involves questions of the proper division of personal property 
between spouses, the effect of a stipulation and order on the ability of the court to 
hold a party in contempt for conduct that pre-dated the stipulation and order, and 
the effect of bankruptcy on the ability of former spouses to obtain judgments 
against each other for non-support debts discharged in bankruptcyr. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court 
In July, 2001, Kristen Davenport brought a divorce action against Robert 
Davenport seeking orders for property division, support, debt division and other 
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orders typical of divorce cases. (R 7-10). At an Order to Show Cause hearing on 
September 5, 2001, Mr. Davenport was ordered to temporarily pay the 1st 
mortgage on the parties' marital home in lieu of child support and alimony. (R. 
31). Both parties were also "restrained from disposing or hiding of assets during 
the pendency of this action." (R. 30). 
After a series of Orders to Show Cause and an unsuccessful effort to 
bifurcate the divorce, the Court granted a motion to bifurcate the divorce on May 
16, 2002 (R. 99). 
On January 7, 2003, the parties reached a written agreement which settled 
most of the issues in the case, but reserved the issues of (1) retroactivity of child 
support (R. 148), (2) ongoing alimony and retroactivity of alimony (R. 147), (3) 
distribution of the parties' real property (R. 147), (4) offsets for 
Respondent/Appellant's sale of the 4-wheeler (R. 146), (5) payment of the 
mortgage payment (R. 145), (6) division of the parties' time share (R. 145), (7) 
division of debts (R. 145), and payment of attorney fees (R. 143). 
In their Stipulation, the parties did not reserve any issue of contempt for 
non-compliance with the Court's prior orders (R. 143-151), and, on March 21, 
2003, the Court approved the parties' agreement and entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce consistent with the parties' 
Stipulation (R. 162-184). 
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Thereafter, on January 27, 2004, a bench trial was held to settle the 
unresolved issues (R. 322). The Court issued a Memorandum Decision oa 
February 6, 2004 (R. 366). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Supplement 
to a Decree of Divorce and an Order Supplemental to a Decree of Divorce were 
entered on March 1,2004 (R. 367-384). 
This appeal, filed by Mr. Davenport on March 26, 2004, is from the 
Findings and Order Supplemental to a Decree of Divorce (R. 390). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In July, 2001, Kristen Davenport sought a divorce from her husband of five 
(5) years, Robert Davenport. (R 7-10). At an Order to Show Cause heariag on 
September 5, 2001, Mr. Davenport was ordered to temporarily pay the 1st 
mortgage on the parties' marital home in lieu of child support and alimony. (R. 
31). Both parties were also "restrained from disposing or hiding of assets during 
the pendency of this action." (R. 30). 
In either November or December, 2001 or on April 2, 2002, Mr. Davenport 
sold the parties' 4-wheeler and a trailer, in violation of the Court's September 5, 
2001 order. (R. 423, p. 19, line 24 through p. 20, line 8 - testimony of Kristen 
Davenport) (R. 423, p. 58, line 10 through p. 6, line 22 - testimony of Robert 
Davenport) (R. 365 and R 424, Exhibit 11 support the April 2, 2002 selling 
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date—that date believed by the Court in its Memorandum Decision). The selling 
price for the 4-wheeler and trailer was 3,500 (R. 434, p. 93). 
Over a year after the wrongful sale, on January 7, 2003, the parties reached 
an agreement regarding the 4-wheeler. The agreement ambiguously stated: "The 
Petitioner is awarded the 4-wheeler and Honda which he represents has been sold. 
The issue of offsets for Respondent's sale is reserved." (R. 146). It is apparent 
from the foregoing language that the parties and their counsel either confused the 
words "Petitioner" and "Respondent" or confused the parties' sex, as Petitioner is 
a "she" and Respondent is a "he". 
On March 21,2003, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Decree of Divorce consistent with the parties' Stipulation (R. 162-
184). The paragraphs in the Findings and Decree regarding the 4-wheeler 
mirrored exactly the ambiguous language in the parties' Stipulation and did not 
reserve any issue of contempt for the sale of the 4-wheeler (R. 168-169,180). 
Subsequently, the Court, after trial, ordered Mr. Davenport to pay Mrs. 
Davenport the entire $3,500.00 proceeds from the sale of the 4-wheeler and 
trailer, without resolving the related ambiguity in the Court's March 21, 2003 
order (R. 365-366). The Court also held Mr. Davenport in contempt for the 
wrongful sale (R. 366). 
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Also in violation of the Court's September 5, 2001 order, Mr. Davenport, 
beginning in September, 2002, ceased to maintain the ongoing 1st mortgage 
payments on the parties' marital home (R. 423, p. 19, lines 8-11, p. 48, lines 12-
15). As a result the home was lost in foreclosure (R. 423, p. 27, lines 4-7). 
Nevertheless, on January 7, 2003, after all of the parties were aware that 
Mr. Davenport had violated the Court's order regarding the mortgage payments, 
the parties reached a written agreement regarding the mortgage payments which 
simply stated that the issue of distribution of the real property was reserved (R. 
145) and that payment of the mortgage payment pursuant to the temporary order 
was reserved (R. 145). No issue of contempt was reserved. 
By interlineations, the parties excised a portion of a paragraph from the 
Stipulation which would have required the parties to continue to be bound by the 
temporary order regarding payment of the mortgage payment in lieu of cMld 
support and alimony (R. 149) (The excised portion read "The parties will be 
bound by the temporary order of support regarding child support and alimony 
until the house sells and the mortgage payments made by Respondent will be 
considered alimony and child support"). In place of the excised requirement to 
pay the mortgage payment in lieu of alimony and child support, the parties set a 
fixed child support figure, effective beginning January 1, 2003 (R. 149) and 
reserved ongoing alimony for future decision by the Court (R. 147). 
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The intent of the parties to not require Mr. Davenport to continue payment 
the ongoing mortgage payments was further confirmed by the parties' additional 
interlineations of paragraph 12 of their Stipulation, wherein they excised the 
following language: "Until the home is sold, Respondent will pay the first 
mortgage in lieu of alimony and child support...." (R. 145-146). 
Despite the fact that the parties' Stipulation would effectively modify the 
temporary orders regarding payment of the 1st mortgage, on March 21, 2003, the 
Court approved the parties Stipulation and entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce consistent therewith. (R. 162-184). 
After bench trial, though, the Court held Mr. Davenport in contempt for his 
non-payment of the mortgage payments (R. 361). 
On January 14, 2003, Mr. Davenport filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy (R. 423, p. 
22, line 21 through p. 23, line 5; R 424, Exhibit 1). Despite the bankruptcy, the 
Court entered judgment against Mr. Davenport and in favor of Mrs. Davenport for 
a pre-bankruptcy debt the Court found to be owed to Mrs. Davenport representing 
the $3,500 proceeds of sale of the 4-wheeler. (R. 365). The Court did not make 
any findings that the 4-wheeler debt owed to Mrs. Davenport was in the nature of 
support (R. 358-366). 
Within two days of the date Mr. Davenport's attorney accepted service of 
the Complaint in this case, Mrs. Davenport's attorney requested temporary 
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alimony and child support for her client (R. 5, 16). At a hearing on the issue held 
shortly thereafter, Mr. Davenport was ordered to pay the 1st mortgage in lieu of 
child support and alimony (R. 31). That order continued until the parties reached 
an agreement in January, 2003, which the Court subsequently approved (L 151, 
184). The parties agreement set child support based on Utah guidelines and 
reserved the issue of future alimony for trial (R. 147, 148-149). At trial, the Court 
awarded judgment for unpaid alimony and equalized the parties' future standard 
of living by awarding ongoing and retroactive alimony from January, 2003 
forward (R. 361,366). 
Despite the fact that the parties' incomes had been equalized since the 
commencement of the divorce proceedings and that, as a result, both parties 
presumptively had the same ability to pay attorney's fees, the Court, ordered Mr. 
Davenport to pay all of Mrs. Davenport's attorney's fees and costs after finding 
that the fees and costs were reasonable and that Mrs. Davenport did not have the 
means to pay her fees (R. 360). The Court did not make any finding regarding 
whether Mr. Davenport had the ability to assist with the payment of Mrs, 
Davenport's fees (R. 360). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should have either awarded all of the proceeds of the four-
wheeler and trailer to Respondent/Appellant because the parties' Stipulation and 
Decree of Divorce awarded the four-wheeler to Respondent/Appellant (or at least 
the order is ambiguous regarding that issue and the trial Court did not resolve the 
ambiguity). Alternatively, the proceeds from sale of the four-wheeler and trailer 
should have been equally divided because that is the presumptively appropriate 
division of marital assets such as these. 
The Court erred in holding Mr. Davenport in contempt for his sale of the 
four-wheeler and trailer. Prior to the parties reaching an agreement, Mr. 
Davenport sold the four-wheeler and trailer in violation of the Court's prior order. 
However, an agreement subsequent to Mr. Davenport's violation of the Court's 
order resolved all issues except those issues which were reserved. The issue of 
contempt for sale of the four-wheeler was not reserved, and was therefore 
resolved by the parties' agreement. The Court approved the parties' agreement 
and entered an order consistent therewith. Once the Court entered said order, the 
issue of contempt for sale of the four-wheeler was no longer properly before the 
Court. Therefore, the Court's subsequent contempt order against Mr. Davenport 
was improper and erroneous. 
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The Court erred in holding Mr. Davenport in contempt for his failure to 
make the 1st mortgage payments. Prior to the parties reaching an agreement, Mr. 
Davenport failed to make the 1st mortgage payments ordered by the Court. 
However, an agreement subsequent to Mr. Davenport's violation of the Court's 
order resolved all issues except those issues which were reserved. The issue of 
contempt for non-payment of the 1st mortgage was not reserved, and therefore 
resolved by the parties' agreement. The Court approved the parties' agreement 
and entered an order consistent therewith. Once the Court entered said older, the 
issue of contempt for non-payment of the 1st mortgage was no longer properly 
before the Court. Therefore, the Court's subsequent contempt order against Mr. 
Davenport was improper and erroneous. 
Additionally, the parties' agreement (which the Court approved and 
adopted in its Order) nullified any further obligation for Mr. Davenport to pay the 
1st mortgage payment pursuant to the Court's temporary order. Therefore, Mr. 
Davenport could not be held in contempt for non-payment of the Ist mortgage 
after the date of the parties' agreement. 
The Court erred in requiring Mr. Davenport to pay Mr. Davenport's 
attorney's fees and costs for two reasons. First, the Court did not make any 
finding that Mr. Davenport had the ability to pay Mrs. Davenport's fees. Second, 
the parties' presumptively had the same ability to pay their own and the other 
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party's attorney's fees because the Court retroactively equalized the parties' 
standards of living—creating a condition in which neither party had greater ability 
to pay fees than the other party. 
The Court erred in entering judgment against Mr. Davenport for debt the 
Court found he owed Mrs. Davenport for the sale of the four-wheeler and trailer. 
The debt to Mrs. Davenport for the sale of the four-wheeler and trailer arose prior 
to Mr. Davenport filing bankruptcy. Therefore, it was discharged in Mr. 
Davenport's Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Court's judgment against Mr. Davenport 
was, with regard to the four-wheeler debt, in violation of federal bankruptcy law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court erred in failing to award Appellant one-half of the proceeds 
from the sale of the parties' four-wheeler, instead awarding the entire 
proceeds to Appellee. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(1) permits the Court to include in a 
divorce decree "equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts, or 
obligations, and parties." U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1). 
In determining property division, a trial court has considerable discretion, 
and its actions enjoy a presumption of validity. Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 
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Utah App. 2002); Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskev, 19 P.3d 1005 (Utah App. 2001); 
Parker v. Parker, 996 P.2d 565 (Utah App. 2000). 
Nevertheless, the Court should presumptively award each of the parties 
50% of the marital property and all of his or her separate property. Bradford v. 
Bradford, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999) cert, denied 4 P.3d 1289. 
In the instant case, the parties had reached an agreement regarding the 
division of their personal property. That stipulation, which was filed with and 
approved by the Court, provided, in relevant part: "The Petitioner is awarded the 
4-wheeler and Honda, which he represents has been sold." (R. 146). 
Without knowing whether Mr. or Mrs. Davenport was the Petitioner, the 
casual reader of the foregoing paragraph would presume that Mr. Davenport was 
awarded the 4-wheeler. However, once the reader realizes that Mrs. Davenport 
was the Petitioner, the issue becomes ambiguous. 
It was unclear from the plain language of the Stipulation whether the 4-
wheeler was awarded to Mr. Davenport or Mrs. Davenport. The intention of the 
parties is unclear. 
The trial court made no effort to resolve the ambiguity and determine who 
the parties intended would be the owner of the 4-wheeler. Instead, the Court 
simply required Mr. Davenport to pay the entire value of the 4-wheeler to Mrs. 
Davenport, and stated: "Ordinarily, Petitioner would be entitled to one-half of 
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such funds, however, the Court finds that such funds should have been 
immediately applied against the amount owing on Petitioner's Explorer vehicle." 
(R. 365). 
Apparently, the trial court was not even considering the parties' agreement 
and the award in Decree of Divorce, but was simply assuming that the parties had 
not reached an agreement regarding the division of the 4-wheeler. Such failure is 
clear error by the trial court. 
However, even if the parties had not reached an agreement, nevertheless, it 
is difficult to decipher the reasoning behind the Court's award of the entire 
proceeds to Appellee, especially in light of the Court's admission that 
Petitioner/Appellee would ordinarily be entitled to only one-half of such funds. 
Perhaps the trial court was indicating that the delay in paying the funds to 
Appellee justified Appellee receiving all of the funds (i.e., the interest that would 
have been earned on the funds while Appellant had use of those funds equaled his 
half of the value of the asset). But no facts or findings support such a conclusion 
(e.g., facts or findings that the reasonable value of his use of one-half of the value 
of the asset equaled the value of Appellee's portion of the asset). 
Because of the ambiguity in the parties' agreement and the uncertain 
reasoning behind the Court's Findings and Conclusions regarding the 4-wheeler, 
the Court of Appeals should remand this issue to the trial court for determination 
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of the parties5 intentions in their ambiguous Stipulation regarding the division of 
the 4-wheeler, or should order the trial court to equally divide the proceeds from 
sale of the 4-wheeler. 
POINT II 
The trial court erred in holding Appellant in contempt for his sale of the 
parties' four-wheeler, because the parties reached a written stipulation after 
all parties were aware of the sale, which the Court approved by entering a 
Decree of Divorce consistent therewith, which only reserved the issue of 
offsets for sale and did not reserve any issue of contempt regarding the sale. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-32-1(5) defines the actions that constitute 
contempt of the authority of the court. They include, in relevant part, 
"[disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court." U.C.A. § 
78-32-1(5). 
However, despite disobedience of a court order, before a person can be 
found guilty of contempt for such disobedience, the Court must find that such 
person was able to comply with the court's order or that he intentionally deprived 
himself of the ability to comply with such order. Osmus v. Osmus, 198 P.2d 222 
(Utah 1948). 
In summary, for contempt to be found, there must be a valid and 
enforceable court order and the person against whom contempt is sought must be 
found capable of complying with such order. 
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As a further caveat, it would appear reasonable (although no Utah case 
could be found that addressed this issue) that for contempt to be found that Court 
should not have previously nullified or obviated the order on which contempt was 
based. 
In this case, at an Order to Show Cause hearing on September 5, 2001, both 
parties were also "restrained from disposing or hiding of assets during the 
pendency of this action." (R. 30). 
In either November or December, 2001 or on April 2, 2002, Mr. Davenport 
sold the parties' 4-wheeler and a trailer, in violation of the Court's September 5, 
2001 order. (R. 423, p. 19, line 24 through p. 20, line 8 - testimony of Kristen 
Davenport) (R. 423, p. 58, line 10 through p. 6, line 22 - testimony of Robert 
Davenport) (R. 365 and R 424, Exhibit 11 support the April 2, 2002 selling 
date—that date believed by the Court in its Memorandum Decision). The selling 
price for the 4-wheeler and trailer was 3,500 (R. 434, p. 93). 
Over a year after the wrongful sale, on January 7, 2003, the parties reached 
an agreement regarding the 4-wheeler. The agreement ambiguously stated: "The 
Petitioner is awarded the 4-wheeler and Honda which he represents has been sold. 
The issue of offsets for Respondent's sale is reserved." (R. 146). 
On March 21, 2003, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Decree of Divorce consistent with the parties' Stipulation (R. 162-
22 
184). The paragraphs in the Findings and Decree regarding the 4-wheeler 
mirrored exactly the ambiguous language in the parties' Stipulation and did not 
reserve any issue of contempt for the sale of the 4-wheeler (R. 168-169, 180). 
By entering Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
Divorce consistent with the parties' Stipulation, and which resolved all issues 
before the Court except those issues reserved, the Court effectively obviated all 
matters before it that were not reserved. 
Because the Decree did not reserve any issue of contempt for sale of the 4-
wheeler, once the Court entered the Decree it also eliminated, resolved, and 
obviated the contempt issue. 
As a result, the Court was acting improperly when it resurrected the 
previously resolved issued of contempt at trial. 
The Court's entry of an order of contempt for Appellant's sale of the 4-
wheeler was therefore plainly in error and should be reversed. 
POINT III 
The trial court erred in holding Appellant in contempt for his failure to 
make timely mortgage payments, because the parties reached a written 
stipulation after all parties were aware of the failure to timely make 
mortgage payments, which the Court approved by entering a Decree of 
Divorce consistent therewith, which only reserved the issue of judgment for 
the unpaid amounts, and did not reserve any issue of contempt regarding the 
mortgage payments. 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-32-1(5) defines the actions that constitute 
contempt of the authority of the court. They include, in relevant part, 
"[disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court." U.C.A. § 
78-32-1(5). 
However, despite disobedience of a court order, before a person can be 
found guilty of contempt for such disobedience, the Court must find that such 
person was able to comply with the court's order or that he intentionally deprived 
himself of the ability to comply with such order. Osmus v. Osmus, 198 P.2d 222 
(Utah 1948). 
In summary, for contempt to be found, there must be a valid and 
enforceable court order and the person against whom contempt is sought must be 
found capable of complying with such order. 
As a further caveat, it would appear reasonable (although no Utah case 
could be found that addressed this issue) that for contempt to be found that Court 
should not have previously nullified or obviated the order on which contempt was 
based. 
In the instant case, at an Order to Show Cause hearing on September 5, 
2001, Mr. Davenport was ordered to temporarily pay the 1st mortgage on the 
parties' marital home in lieu of child support and alimony. (R. 31). 
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In violation of the Court's September 5, 2001 order, Mr. Davenport, 
beginning in September, 2002, ceased to maintain the ongoing 1st mortgage 
payments on the parties' marital home (R. 423, p. 19, lines 8-11, p. 48, lines 12-
15). As a result the home was lost in foreclosure (R. 423, p. 27, lines 4-7). 
Nevertheless, on January 7, 2003, after all of the parties were aware that 
Mr. Davenport had violated the Court's order regarding the mortgage payments, 
the parties reached a written agreement regarding the mortgage payments which 
simply stated that the issue of distribution of the real property was reserved (R. 
145) and that payment of the mortgage payment pursuant to the temporary order 
was reserved (R. 145). No issue of contempt was reserved. 
By interlineations, the parties excised a portion of a paragraph from the 
Stipulation which would have required the parties to continue to be bound by the 
temporary order regarding payment of the mortgage payment in lieu of cMld 
support and alimony (R. 149) (The excised portion read "The parties will be 
bound by the temporary order of support regarding child support and alimony 
until the house sells and the mortgage payments made by Respondent will be 
considered alimony and child support"). In place of the excised requirement to 
pay the mortgage payment in lieu of alimony and child support, the parties set a 
fixed child support figure, effective beginning January 1, 2003 (R. 149) and 
reserved ongoing alimony for future decision by the Court (R. 147). 
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The intent of the parties to not require Mr. Davenport to continue payment 
the ongoing mortgage payments after January 7, 2003 was further confirmed by 
the parties' additional interlineations of paragraph 12 of their Stipulation, wherein 
they excised the following language: "Until the home is sold, Respondent will 
pay the first mortgage in lieu of alimony and child support...." (R. 145-146). 
Despite the fact that the parties' Stipulation would effectively modify the 
temporary orders regarding payment of the 1st mortgage, on March 21, 2003, the 
Court approved the parties Stipulation and entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce consistent therewith. (R. 162-184). 
Despite the foregoing, after a bench trial, though, the Court held Mr. 
Davenport in contempt for his non-payment of the mortgage payments (R. 361). 
Such contempt finding was improper for two reasons. First, any failure by 
Mr. Davenport to pay the mortgage payments prior to January 7, 2003 was 
resolved by the parties' agreement (subsequently approved by the Court) which 
did not reserve the issue of contempt for non-payment of the mortgage. 
Second, any failure by Mr. Davenport to pay the mortgage payments after 
January 7, 2003 was not in violation of any court order because the parties' 
stipulation that day (subsequently approved by the court) modified the ongoing 
support order and eliminated the requirement that he pay ongoing mortgage 
payments. 
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Any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the parties' agreement 
from January 7, 2003. Whereas, prior to January 7, 2003, the alimony and child 
support obligations were not separately specified, but, rather, lumped into one 
payment of the 1st mortage, after Januaiy 7, 2003 a specific child support amount 
was set ($321.00 per month) and the issue of alimony from January 7, 2003 
forward was reserved for trial. 
Also, the interlineations which specifically removed from the parties' 
Stipulation any requirement of ongoing payment of the mortgage after January 7, 
2003 demonstrate the parties' intentions that Mr. Davenport would not be 
obligated after January 7, 2003 to pay the ongoing mortgage. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court's finding of contempt against Mr. 
Davenport for non-payment of the 1st mortgage should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
The trial court erred in requiring Appellant to pay Appellee's attorney's fees 
and costs without adequate findings and because each party had essentially 
equal financial ability (in light of the Court's retroactive equalization of the 
parties' standard of living through support awards). 
Utah Code Section 30-3-3(1) permits the Court to order a party to pay the 
other party's costs and attorney fees in actions to establish custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case. U.C.A. § 30-3-
3(1). 
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Utah Courts have confirmed the ability of trial courts to make fee and cost 
awards in divorce cases. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah 1998); Childs v. 
Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998). 
However, the trial court may not merely award fees and costs without 
adequate reasoning and findings. Utah appellate courts have consistently held that 
for a trial court to award fees in a divorce case, the trial court must find (1) that 
the fees sought are reasonable, (2) the receiving spouse is in need of assistance in 
paying her attorney's fees and costs, and (3) the other spouse has the ability to pay 
his own fees and costs as well as the receiving spouse's fees and costs. Wells v. 
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1994); Peterson v. Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah 
1991). The moving party has the burden of establishing all three of these 
elements at trial. Griffith v. Griffith, 59 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1998) affirmed 
985 P.2d 155 (Utah 1999). 
In the instant case, the Court did not make the requisite findings to justify 
its award of attorney fees and costs. While the trial court did find that the fees 
and costs incurred by Petitioner/Appellee were "reasonable and proper in 
representing Petitioner and that Petitioner does not have the financial means 
available to pay her attorney fees," it did not make any analysis of whether 
Appellant had the ability to pay Appellee's fees (R. 360). 
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Without a determination of ability pay, the trial court's award of attorney's 
fees and costs is improper and should be reversed and perhaps remanded for 
further proceedings to determine whether Appellant has the ability to pay 
Appellee's fees and costs. 
However, remand may not be necessary, as the facts of this case establish 
without further review that Appellant is not capable of paying Appellee's fees and 
costs, and an award of attorney fees and costs in this case would be in error. 
Shortly after the divorce case was commenced (two days after an 
Acceptance of Service was signed by Appellant's attorney on July 25, 2001), 
Petitioner brought an Order to Show Cause to set temporary child support and 
alimony (R. 16). 
At the Order to Show Cause hearing, the trial court presumptively 
equalized the parties' standard of living by ordering Appellant to pay a monthly 
sum in lieu of alimony and child support (R. 33). 
Throughout the proceedings, the Court provided for equalizing of the 
parties' standard of living through ongoing support orders or provision for 
retroactive income/living standard equalization at the time of trial. (R. 361-362 -
Prior to January, 2003 the parties were operating under the temporary 
alimony/child support order of the Court. At trial the Court set alimony from 
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January 2003 through January 2004 at $600.00 per month and set ongoing 
alimony after January 2004 at $500 per month for the following three years). 
Because Appellee was awarded support funds to equalize the parties' 
standard of living throughout the pendency of the divorce proceedings and for 
three years after the final trial, both parties had similar abilities to pay attorney 
fees and costs, and neither party was more capable of paying fees and costs than 
the other party. 
As an illustration of this fact, the parties had previously stipulated that 
Appellant's gross monthly income was $2,900 per month and that Appellant's 
gross monthly income was $1,667.00 per month (R. 149). 
After subtracting the child support obligation of $321.00 per month (R. 14) 
from Appellant's gross income and adding that amount to Appellee's gross 
income, the difference in gross income (not net income) of the parties pursuant to 
their stipulation was only $591.00 per month. Therefore, a strict equalization of 
gross (not net) incomes would have resulted in an alimony award of only $295.50 
per month (rather than the much larger award entered by the Court). 
While strict equalization of gross income may not result in true equalization 
of the parties' standard of living (especially when, as here, there is a minor child 
involved), nevertheless it is illustrative of the relative financial abilities of each of 
the parties, and demonstrates the error of concluding that Appellant had 
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sufficiently greater financial resources than Appellee to enable him to pay his ex-
spouses attorney fees and costs in addition to his own attorney fees and costs. 
It is an axiom of Utah divorce law that a former wife is not entitled to 
attorney fees at trial when the financial abilities of the former wife and the former 
husband are essentially equal. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah 
1992). Such is the case here in the light of the Court's equalization of financial 
abilities throughout the pendency of the case and thereafter. 
POINT V 
The trial court erred in entering judgment against Appellant for the 
proceeds of sale of the parties' four-wheeler, after Appellant had obtained a 
discharge in bankruptcy on this non-support debt. 
Section 524 of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides, in relevant 
part, that the discharge obtained in a bankruptcy case "operates as in injunction 
against the commencement or continuation of any action . . . to collect, recover, or 
offset any such debt [debts discharged under Section 728 of the Bankruptcy Code] 
as a personal liability of the debtor . . . " 11 U.S.C. § 524. 
Section 727(b) states that in general a discharge in Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
"discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for 
relief under this chapter,. . ." 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). 
On January 7, 2003, the parties reached an agreement in this case regarding 
the division of their 4-wheeler (R. 146). That agreement fixed the parties' relative 
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rights with respect to their 4-wheeler and was subsequently approved by the 
Court. 
Thereafter, on January 14, 2003, Mr. Davenport filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
(R. 423, p. 22, line 21 through p. 23, line 5; R 424, Exhibit 1). Despite the 
bankruptcy, the Court entered judgment against Mr. Davenport and in favor of 
Mrs. Davenport for the pre-bankruptcy debt the Court found to be owed to Mrs. 
Davenport representing the $3,500 proceeds of sale of the 4-wheeler. (R. 365). 
The debt owed to Mrs. Davenport on the 4-wheeler accrued not later on 
January 7, 2003 when the parties reached their agreement regarding their relative 
rights in the 4-wheeler. The subsequent bankruptcy discharge received by Mr. 
Davenport discharged this obligation to Mrs. Davenport and operated as an 
injunction against the trial court and Mrs. Davenport from entering a judgment 
against Mr. Davenport for the value of the 4-wheeler. 
In short, Mr. Davenport's debt to Mrs. Davenport was discharged in 
bankruptcy and should not have been reduced to judgment by the Court. The trial 
court's judgment in this regard should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's 
judgment requiring him to pay Appellee the proceeds of sale of the 4-wheeler and 
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trailer. He also requests that the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's 
contempt order derived from his sale of the 4-wheeler and from his non-payment 
of the 1st mortgage. He further requests that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial 
court's award of attorney's fees and costs, or, alternative, that the Court of 
Appeals remand for the trial court to make appropriate findings regarding 
Appellant's ability to pay those fees and costs. 
DATED this ^ 2 - day of S^-U^J~^] , 2004. 
GUY L. BLACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
A. Utah Code, Section 30-3-3(1), 30-3-5(1), 78-32-1(5), 11 U.S.C. § 524, 
727(b) 
B. Stipulation of the Parties 
C. Memorandum Decision from the Trial Court 
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Tab A 
7 HUSBAND AND WIFE 30-3-4 
Section 
30-3-16. Repealed. 
30-3-16.1. Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers. 
30-3-16.2. Petition for conciliation. 
30-3-16.3. Contents of petition. 
30-3-16.4 Procedure upon filing of petition. 
30-3-16.5. Fees. 
30-3-16.6. Information not available to public. 
30-3-16.7. Effect of petition — Pendency of action. 
30-3-17. Power and jurisdiction of judge 
30-3-17.1. Proceedings deemed confidential — Written 
evaluation by counselor 
30-3-18. Waiting period for hearing after filing for di-
vorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and 
education services not to be construed as 
condonation or promotion. 
30-3-19 to 30-3-31. Repealed. 
30-3-32. Parent-time — Intent — Policy — Definitions. 
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
30-3-34. Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for chil-
dren 5 to 18 years of age. 
30-3-35.5. Minimum schedule for parent-time for chil-
dren under five years of age. 
30-3-36. Special circumstances. 
30-3-37. Relocation. 
30-3-38. Pilot Program for Expedited Parent-time En-
forcement. 
30-3-1. Procedure — Res idence — Grounds. 
<1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as 
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as 
provided in this chapter. 
(2) The court .may decree a dissolution of the marriage 
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the 
grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases where the 
petitioner or respondent has been an actual and bona fide 
resident of this state and of the county where the action is 
brought, or if members of the armed forces of the United 
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the 
petitioner has been stationed in this state under military 
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of 
the action. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of mar-
riage; 
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent 
to marriage; 
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent 
for more than one year; 
(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the 
petitioner the common necessaries of life; 
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent; 
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony; 
(g) cruel t reatment of the petitioner by the respondent 
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental 
distress to the petitioner; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately 
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for 
three consecutive years without cohabitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does 
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for 
separate maintenance previously granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of 
insanity unless: 
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the 
appropriate authorities of this or another s tate prior 
to the commencement of the action; and 
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent 
witnesses t ha t trie insanity o? the respondent is 
incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guard-
ian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respon-
dent A copy of the summons and complaint shall be 
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as 
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for 
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the 
county attorney for the county where the action is prose-
cuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the meri ts of 
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state, 
take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and 
make a defense as is jus t to protect the rights of the 
respondent and the interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction 
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, 
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as 
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent 
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent 
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of 
the respondent by two or more competent physicians, to 
determine the mental condition of the respondent. For 
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to 
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent 
may be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be 
apportioned by the court. 1997 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife 
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may 
obtain a divorce from her husband. 1953 
30-3-3. Award of costs , a t torney and wi tness fees — 
Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and 
in any action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may order a par ty to pay the costs, attorney 
fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the 
other party to enable the other par ty to prosecute or defend 
the action. The order may include provision for costs of the 
action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fee5 or limited fees against a party if the court finds the par ty 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
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order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
par ty and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 2001 
30-3-4. P leadings — Find ings — Decree — Use of affi-
davit — Seal ing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the 
30-3-4.1 
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cause If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
r e ^ o n d e n t , evidence to support the decree may be sub-
x n ^ e d upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described m 
Section 30 3 11 3, and have presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course attendance and com-
pletion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the 
best interest of the parties 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78 3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council The 
court or the commissioner m all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree 1997 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Dispos i t ion of property — Maintenance and 
heal th care of part ies and children — Divi-
s ion of debts — Court to have cont inuing 
jurisdict ion — Custody and parent-time — 
Determinat ion of al imony — Nonmeritorious 
pet i t ion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children, 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children, 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6 5 
(l) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage, 
(n) an order requiring the parties to notify respec 
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties ' separate, current addresses, and 
(111) provisions for the enforcement of these orders, 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding m accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services 
(2) The court may include, m an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or t ram 
mg of the custodial parent If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and tha t the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other mat ters 
related to children born to the mother and father after entry of 
the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modifica 
tion 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and 
visitation rights of grandparents and other members of 
the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may mclude in an 
order establishing a parent- t ime or visitation schedule a 
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace 
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation 
schedule entered under this chapter 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-
time provisions of a CDurt order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the pre\ ailing party in that action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith 
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
parent-time order by a parent , or a visitation order by a 
grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78-32-12 2 where a visitation or parent-time 
right has been previously granted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing par ty costs, including actual attorney 
fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation or parent-time 
(8) (a) The court shall consider a t least the following fac-
tors m determining alimony 
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse, 
(n) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income, 
(m) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support, 
(iv) the length of the marriage, 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of 
minor children requiring support, 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a busi-
ness owned or operated by the payor spouse, and 
(vn) whether the recipient spouse directly contrib-
uted to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for educ ation received by the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the 
marriage 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection 
(8)(a) However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base 
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time 
of trial In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living 
78-32-1 JUDICIAL CODE 686 
Section 
78 32-6 Duty of sheriff 
78-32-7 Bail bond — Form 
78-32-8 Officer's return 
78-32-9 Hearing 
78-32-10 Contempt — Action by court 
78-32 11 Damages to party aggrieved 
78-32 12 Imprisonment to compel performance 
78-32 12 1 Compensatory service for violation of parent-
time order or failure to pay child support 
78-32-12 2 Definitions — Sanctions 
78 32-12 3 Repealed 
78-32-13 Procedure when party charged fails to appear 
78-32-14 Excuse for nonappearance — Unnecessary re 
straint forbidden 
78-32-15 Contempt of process of nonjudicial officer 
78-32-16 Procedure 
78-32-17 Noncompliance with child support order 
78-32-1. Acts and omiss ions const i tut ing contempt. 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or 
proceedings therein are contempts of the authority of the 
court 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior to-
ward the judge while holding the court, tendmg to inter-
rupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent 
disturbance, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial 
or other judicial proceeding 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or 
violation of duty by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or 
other person appointed or elected to perform a judicial or 
ministerial service 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the 
court, by a party to an action or special proceeding 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or pro-
cess of the court 
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a 
court, and acting as such without authority 
(7) Rescuing any person or property m the custody of 
an officer by virtue of an order or process of such court 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an 
action while going to, remaining at, or returning from, the 
court where the action is on the calendar for trial 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or 
proceedings of a court 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refus-
ing to be sworn or to answer as a witness 
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting 
to attend or serve as such, or improperly conversing with 
a party to an action to be tried at such court, or with any 
other person, concerning the merits of such action, or 
receiving a communication from a party or other person m 
respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to 
the court 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or 
officer of the lawful judgment, order or process of a 
superior court, or proceeding in an action or special 
proceeding contrary to law, after such action or special 
proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such infe-
rior tribunal, magistrate or officer Disobedience of the 
lawful orders or process of a judicial officer is also a 
contempt of the authority of such officer 1953 
78-32-2. Re-entry after evict ion from real property. 
Every person dispossessed of, or ejected from or out of, any 
real property by the judgment or process of any court of 
competent jurisdiction, who, not having a right so to do, 
re-enters into or upon, or takes possession of, any such real 
property, or induces or procures any person, not having the 
right so to do, or aids or abets him therein, is guilty of a 
contempt of the court by which such judgment was rendered, 
or from which such process issued Upon a conviction for such 
contempt the court must immediately issue an alias process, 
directed to the proper officer, requiring him to restore such 
possession to the party entitled thereto under the original 
judgment or process 1953 
78-32-3. In i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e of court; summary ac-
t ion — Without immediate presence; proce-
dure. 
When a contempt is committed m the immediate view and 
presence of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be 
punished summarily, for which an order must be made, 
reciting the facts as occurring m such immediate view and 
presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is 
thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as 
prescribed m Section 78-32-10 hereof When the contempt is 
not committed m the immediate view and presence of the 
court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to 
the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a 
s tatement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other 
judicial officers 1953 
78-32-4. Warrant of at tachment or commitment order 
to show cause. 
When the contempt is not committed m the immediate view 
and presence of the court or judge a war ran t of attachment 
may be issued to bring the person charged to answer, or, 
without a previous arrest, a warrant of commitment may, 
upon notice, or upon an order to show cause, be granted, and 
no warrant of commitment can be issued without such previ-
ous at tachment to answer, or such notice or order to show 
cause 1953 
78-32-5. Bail. 
Whenever a warrant of at tachment is issued pursuant to 
this chapter, the court or judge must direct, by an indorsement 
on such warrant , tha t the person charged may be [let] to bail 
for his appearance, in an amount prescribed in such indorse-
ment 1953 
78-32-6. Duty of sheriff. 
Upon executing the warrant of at tachment the sheriff must 
keep the person in custody, bring him before the court or judge 
and detain him until an order is made m the premises, unless 
the person arrested entitles himself to be discharged as 
provided m Section 78-32-7 1995 
78-32-7. Bail bond — Form. 
When a direction to let the person arrested to bail is 
contained in the warrant of at tachment or indorsed thereon, 
he must be discharged from the arrest upon executmg and 
delivering to the officer, at any time before the return day of 
the warrant , a written undertaking, with two sufficient sure-
ties, to the effect that the person arrested will appear on the 
return of the warrant , and abide the order of the court or judge 
thereon, or tha t the sureties will pay as may be directed the 
sum specified m the warrant *953 
78-32-8. Officer's return. 
The officer must return the warran t of arrest, and the 
undertaking, if any, received from the person arrested, by the 
return day specified therein 1953 
78-32-9. Hearing. 
When the person arrested has been brought up or has 
appeared the court or judge must proceed to investigate trie 
charge, and must hear any answer which the person arreste 
11 USC §523 BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Rule References: 1019(2), 2002(f), 2002(k), 4007, 7001(6), 9034 
West Key No. Digests References: Bankruptcy <3=> 3341-3388 
11 USC § 524. Effect of discharge 
(a) A discharge in a case under this title— 
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a deter-
mination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged 
under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of 
such debt is waived; 
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, 
the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a 
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; and 
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, 
the employment of process, or an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, prop-
erty of the debtor of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired 
after the commencement of the case, on account of any allowable community claim, 
except a community claim that is excepted from discharge under section 523, 
1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1) of this title, or that would be so excepted, determined in ac-
cordance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of this title, in a case 
concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the date of the filing of the petition in 
the case concerning the debtor, whether or not discharge of the debt based on such 
community claim is waived. 
(b) Subsection (a)(3) of this section does not apply if— 
(1)(A) the debtor's spouse is a debtor in a case under this title, or a bankrupt or a debtor 
in a case under the Bankruptcy Act [former 11 USC §§ 1 et seq.], commenced within 
six years of the date of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the debtor; 
and 
(B) the court does not grant the debtor's spouse a discharge in such case concerning 
the debtor's spouse; or 
(2)(A) the court would not grant the debtor's spouse a discharge in a case under chapter 
7 of this title concerning such spouse commenced on the date of the filing of the pe-
tition in the case concerning the debtor; and 
(B) a determination that the court would not so grant such discharge is made by the 
bankruptcy c ourt within the time and in the manner provided for a determination 
under section 727 of this title of whether a debtor is granted a discharge. 
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for which, 
in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title is en-
forceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or 
not discharge of such debt is waived, only if— 
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the discharge under section 727, 
1141, 1228, or L328 of this title; 
(2)(A) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the 
debtor that the agreement may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within 
sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by 
giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim; and 
(B) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the 
debtor that such agreement is not required under this title, under nonbankruptcy law, 
or under any agreement not in accordance with the provisions of this subsection; 
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if applicable, accompanied by a 
declaration or an affidavit of the attorney that represented the debtor during the course 
of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, which states that 
(A) such agreement represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the 
debtor; 
72 
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(8) the debtor has been granted a discharge under this section, under section 1141 of 
this title, or under section 14, 371, or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act [former 11 USC §§ 32, 
771, 876], in a case commenced within six years before the date of the filing of the pe-
tition; 
(9) the debtor has been granted a discharge under section 1228 or 1328 of this title, or 
under section 660 or 661 of the Bankruptcy Act [former 11 USC §§ 1060, 1061], in a 
case commenced within six years before the date of the filing of the petition, unless 
payments under the plan m such case totaled at least— 
(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such case; or 
(B)(i) 70 percent of such claims; and 
(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, and was the debtor's best 
effort; or 
(10) the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after the 
order for relief under this chapter. 
(b) Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a) of this 
section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief 
under this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is determined under section 502 of this 
title as if such claim had arisen before the commencement of the case, whether or not a 
proof of claim based on any such debt or liability is filed under section 501 of this title, 
and whether or not a claim based on any such debt or liability is allowed under section 502 
of this title. 
(c)(1) The trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee may object to the granting of a 
discharge under subsection (a) of this section. 
(2) On request of a party in interest, the court may order the trustee to examine the acts 
and conduct of the debtor to determine whether a ground exists for denial of discharge. 
(d) On request of the trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee, and after notice and a 
hearing, the court shall revoke a discharge granted under subsection (a) of this section if— 
(1) such discharge was obtained through the fraud of the debtor, and the requesting 
party did not know of such fraud until after the granting of such discharge; 
(2) the debtor acquired property that is property of the estate, or became entitled to 
acquire property that would be property of the estate, and knowingly and fraudulently 
failed to report the acquisition of[J or entitlement to[J such property, or to deliver or 
surrender such property to the trustee; or 
(3) the debtor committed an act specified in subsection (a)(6) of this section. 
(e) The trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee may request a revocation of a 
discharge— 
(1) under subsection (d)(1) of this section[,] within one year after such discharge is 
granted; or 
(2) under subsection (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this section[,] before the later of— 
(A) one year after the granting of such discharge; and 
(B) the date the case is closed. 
Treatise References: Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2d Chapter 74 
Rule References: 2002(f)(6), 2002(k), 4004, 4005, 4006, 4008, 7001(4), 9024, 9034 
West Key No. Digests References: Bankruptcy @=> 3271-3322 
11 USC § 728. Special tax provisions 
(a) For the purposes of any State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income, 
the taxable period of a debtor that is an individual shall terminate on the date of the order 
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courth Judicial District Court 
of utahr County, State of Utah 
- //^/SdS^/ Deputy 
Marilyn Moody Brown, No. 4803 
MOODY BROWN & BROWN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
2525 N. Canyon Rd. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 356-8300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTEN DAVENPORT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ROBERT DAVENPORT, 
Respondent 
COME NOW the parties undersigned and represent to the Court that the following terms are 
fair and reasonable. The parties stipulate and agree, as follows: 
1. Residency. Petitioner is a bona fide resident of Utah County, State of Utah, 
and has been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Marriage Statistics. Petitioner and Respondent were married on May 11,1996, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Bifurcation on May 16, 
2002. 
S T I P U L A T I O N DlVISION#JL 
Civil No. 
Division No. 
3. Child. There has been one child bom as issue of this marriage. Kaiden Austin 
Davenport, born October 9, 1996. 
4. Custody/Visitation. The parties are awarded joint legal custody which is defined 
as giving the parties the rights indicated in U.C.A. §30-3-33. The Mother is a fit and proper person 
to be awarded the permanent physical care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties, 
subject to the Father's right to visit with the child at reasonable times and places as the parties may 
agree. 
a. If they cannot agree, visitation shall be in accordance with provisions in 
U.C.A. §30-3-35 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
b. Pick up and drop off of the child will occur at Petitioner's parent's home 
as long as Petitioner deems it is necessary. 
•G:—Thepai Lies will equally di vide Hie summer vacation period. 1 he Petitiuner 
will havo two throe week periods separated by 30 days. • ^ - - r k S ^ 
d. Two weeks of the summer time will be uninterrupted for each parent and 
the other summer weeks will be interrupted for visitation in accordance with the statute. The 
uninterrupted visitation will be decided 30 days before summer vacation begins. 
-e—The-summcr vacation time will bo determined by Hie school district where 
tb^-^b&4 ir.cjrlpA M\A ntnrt H I P r h y nftpr gr.ftnnl ^nds for t h ^ gUmmf>r 3TTl tmpfi**\\tl. nnli l H ^ W^PT**" ^ 
^ 
before school commenceG for the next school term—^ £*> 
2 
f. The Respondent will have 3 hours of visitation on November 1st (his 
birthday). . ft* 
g. The Petitioner will have 3 hour^ on August 22n (her birthday). <^h n 
h. Each parent will have telephonic visitation at reasonable times. 
i. The mid-week visitation will commence at 5:00 p.m. or after school (when 
the child is in school) and continue until 8:00 p.m. 
j . The parties will inform each other prior to any move. If a party moves out 
of state, the cost of visitation is reserved. 
- k. The Respondent can peifotm-feligious ordinances if the child so dosiros-, 
-and if he is found worthy by both parties' bishops (£? 
5. Child Support. The Father's gross monthly income is-$3; 112 (amount of income y^> 
of Father is reflected on the worksheet). The Mother's gross monthly income is $ 1,667 (amount of \ y 
income is reflected on the worksheet). The supporting Affidavit is attached as Exhibit A. The 
Mofhrr's rhild- support obligation should b p px^ ppi~ mrm-rt^  miH'Thp. Father's child support 
A 12.1 
obligation should be $339 per month. fFh^pfrti^ winhp^uurf byth^tHTip^raiy " i ^ ' nf g"pp,n,yt 
regarding child support and alimony until the house sells and the mortgage payments made by 
Respondent will be considered alimony and child support) The child support obligation of both 
parents should be effective when the home is sold, and continue until a month after the child 
becomes 18 years of age, or until the month after the child's normal and expected date of graduation 
3 
from high school, whichever occurs later. The child support worksheet is attached as Exhibit B. The 
child support is payable one-half on the 5th day of each and every month, and one-half on the 20th day \t ^ 
ofeachmonth. T ^ £ l $ s « 6 o£ reAroacMvfh^A 16 VZSe^v€A UJAM) ^n£ 
(jQwy\<ehDK v<£ MAC W l ^ a f + ^ M - ^ C - N 
i 6. Child Care Expenses. In accordance with U.C.A. §78-45-7.16, each parent shall
 N^< 3 
equally share the reasonable work-related and/or education-related child care expenses for the minor^y^yyi K 
child. 
a. If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin 
paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care 
expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making 
monthly payment of that expense while it is not being incurred without obtaining a modification 
of the child support order. 
b. A parent who incurs child care expense shall provide written 
verification of the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial 
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent. 
c. The parent shall notify the other parent of any change of child care 
provider or the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of the change. 
A parent incurring child care expenses shall be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses 
or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring the expenses fails to 
notify the other parent within said 30 days. 
4 
7. Automatic Transfer. The parties agree that rather than payment of child support to 
the Office of Recovery Services, the Father will cause to be made an automatic withdrawal payable 
to the obligee from Father's bank account to Mother's bank account, one-half on the 5th day of each 
month and a like amount on the 20th day of each month. 
8. Income Withholding. If at any time the Respondent is in arrears by 3 0 days, the 
Mother is entitled to immediate and automatic withholding income as a means of collecting child 
support, pursuant to Sections 30-3-5.1 and 62A-11-101 et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
The Father will pay the processing fees. 
9. Modification. This order is subject to child support modification in accordance 
with U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(7).
 § f <D fj? 
10. Alimony. Until the house is sold, the house payment wijj-be paid which will be " 
considered as child support or alimony. The issue of alimony is lesei ved as long as Respundtnt-ts /ilftf) 
the hou30 maintaining t se payment. If the Respondent fails to pay the niui tgage payment, said ainorari-is-
fl£B4*anla up table since il is being paid in lieu of child support and alimony and will be liealed as 
3uch in any filing for bankruptcy.- . 
fJP 
11. Real Property. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired real 
Tht issues o£ Ai$W\>huh~ur\}&\*£~\ 
property located at 774 West 425 North, Lindon, Utah. Saidnropcrty/will be immediately listed fui ^ 
sale at $ 157,000, with a mutually agreed upon realtor, and sold at an mutually agreeable price. All— A ^ 
remaining proccods will bo equally divided. Until the home is sold, the Respondent will pay the fir^fr^ 
5 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ 
mortgage in -lieu of-afoiiony and child support and the Fexiiioner will pay the secund-moftgage^ 
j&hea-tbe home is sold, the proceeds will be used as follows:- ^A> 
-a. To pay thcnmdeilying obligations (1st and 2"d mortgages)?- , /]\jffsP 
b. To pay the cosis-nlsate.,—7 
-c,—Ih^reeeeds will be equally divided-
x^L .Jf ihere are any unpaid first mortgage payments .they will be added tQ 
Petitioner's share of the proceeds.—• 
12. Personal Property. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties 
have acquired personal property. Said personal property of the parties should be distributed as 
follows: 
a. To the Petitioner: The property as indicated in Exhibit A. 
b. To the Respondent: The property as indicated in Exhibit B. r^> 
c. The Petitioner is awarded the 4 -whee l e^U^^A h *L *ef^eSGMJZS 
V\CtL> U * S*tt* ^ '**<*» <* c f ^ * £v\e%?3Zl^ i* rescued. 
d. The 1997 Ford Explorer will be awarded to the Petitioner. The-. jjr 
Respondent will sign all documents necessary to convey said vehicle to Petitioner. The 
-Petitioner will refinance the vehicle as soon as Respondent has given her the- $6;Q00 that was 
-trarowed against the Explorer.— 
e. Each party is awarded their own personal property and effects and that 
property which is now in their individual possession or under their individual control. 
^ 
6 
I
 fc 13. Debts. The parties acquired debts during the marriage, ffiioh party will assume, > / 
aad~hold the othor harmless from liability on;- f ' ) 
Obligation 
1st Mortgage 
Explorer (which includes a 4-3^a€J§rf"^^^ 
2 mortgage (consu; 
sdjoertoa oans 
Amount 
$19,000.00 
Respondent 
(until sold, then 
!/2 each) 
Petitioner 
Petitioner until 
sold, then lA each 
B alanceTl ^Re^omjgnt 
a. Other Debts. Each party will be responsible to pay any other debt he 
M 
$ 
or she individually incurred, t f l d l$SUC t)( WLljmUAJr of ~H\e. i^tYTj <_g -£- V 
b. Creditors. The parties understand that this debt provision does not /77J//)jr> 
bind third party creditors. 
14. Time Share. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a time \^> • 
Th)i> issue; i6> re^tjr^ea UAJU\ L^M^LeJxtrn &£ /WP 
share in Park City, Utah. The Respondent will sell the lime share and will use the time share $ 
«xtil it is sold and men drvi idc the proceeds. The Roopondcnt will pay Hie cost of the time share 
.until the time share is sold. • 
15. Medical/Dental Expenses. In accordance withU.C.A. §78-45-7.15, insurance for 
the medical and dental expenses of the minor child shall be provided by the party who can obtain the 
best coverage at the most reasonable cost. The Petitioner is currently providing said insurance. 
a. Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the child's portion of insurance. The child's portion of the premium 
is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expenses for the child shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the policy 
and multiplying the result by the number of child in the instant case. 
b. Each parent shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured 
medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, counseling, prescriptions, deductibles, and copayments, 
incurred for the dependent child and actually paid by the parents. 
c. The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent upon initial enrollment of the dependent child, and thereafter on or 
before January 2, of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent of any change of 
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he or she first knew or 
should have known of the change. 
d. The parent who incurs medical and dental expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and payment of medical and dental expenses to the other parent 
within 30 days of payment. If neither party is able to secure said insurance at a reasonable cost, 
each party should be responsible for the payment of one-half of all reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses for the minor child as indicated. 
16. Life Insurance. It is fair and reasonable that each party be ordered to maintain in 
foil force and effect a life insurance policy on his or her life in the face amount of $30,000 until such 
time as the last of the parties' minor child reaches the age of eighteen. During such period, each 
8 
party should be ordered to designate a trustee as beneficiary in trust for the child on said life 
insurance policy. 
17. Retirement. The parties have no retirement or pension accounts. 
18. Dependency Exemption. It is reasonable that the Petitioner should be awarded the 
dependency exemption for the parties' minor child for even-numbered years and the Respondent will 
claim for odd-numbered years; provided, however, that he must be current on his obligations to r>v 
, • t. • Y ^ & 
claim the exemption. \ 
-The (5>5«e <?f atf~c>rr>e4\*>-(er£ is. <*J> 
19. Attorney's Fees and Costs. Each party will pay hio or hor attorney s fcc3. ^ ^ »^ 
Dated this day of November, 2002. 
Krti&A 
KRISTEN DAVENPORT, Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of November, 2002. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Dated this day of November, 2002. 
&A.^. t 
NPORT, Respondent 
9 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of November, 2002. 
Dated this 7 day o 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
20&. 
'MARILYN MOOg»Y BROWN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Dated this / day of November, 2002. 
R&SIMOND BLAKEfcdCK 
Attorney for Respondent 
10 
EXHIBIT A 
Property to be awarded to Petitioner 
V2 family pictures 
^My> Clock hand gun • JBike tan^e^ s -Palm pander., Pictures taken from homo- it 
11 
EXHIBIT B 
Property to be awarded to Respondent 
IHfcog bed- Vi family pictures 
-Log^ag^itaiid^ Hbag"5tool^t^-
f- flrfrsf °t <wy S) <ffl" £r 
12 
EXHIBIT C 
Parenting Plan 
The parties are awarded joint legal custody. Joint legal custody will be defined as follows: 
(1) The parties will trade favors and cooperatively build good will with 
each other to ensure that Kaiden wins. 
(2) The Respondent will be notified of any extra-curricular activities 
Kaiden chooses to participate in and both parties will equally share the costs of such activities. 
(3) The parties will share itineraries and emergency contact telephone 
numbers whenever traveling with Kaiden on a vacation. The child will call the other co-parent when 
they arrive at the initial destination. 
wp\a-g\davenport.stp 
November 26, 2002 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTEN DAVENPORT, 
vs. 
ROBERT DAVENPORT, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 0144001643 
JUDGE: GARY D STOTT 
CLERK: KS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
On January 27, 2004, counsel and the parties appeared for the purpose of addressing 
issues reserved by way of bifurcation as to the complaint for divorce. Witnesses were called and 
testified, evidence was introduced and argument of counsel was presented. Upon the receipt of 
such information the Court took the matter under advisement. The Court, being fully advised as 
to all of the issues, now enters the following memorandum decision. 
1. DELINQUENT SUPPORT 
Based upon the parties' stipulation at the time of trial the Court enters judgments for the 
months of September, October, November and December 2002 in favor of Petitioner against 
Respondent, for failure to pay the first mortgage on the property in lieu of support in the amount 
of$3704. 
2. DELINQUENT DENTAL EXPENSES 
Based upon the evidence provided, the Court finds that Respondent has failed to pay the 
sum of $296 representing his share of dental expenses not covered and paid by insurance, which 
were incurred by the parties. Petitioner is granted judgment for that amount. 
3. IMPROPER DISPOSAL OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Prior to the hearing on this case on January 27,2004, the parties were under an order of 
the Court that neither shall dispose of any of the personal property of the parties without the other 
party's and the Court's approval. The evidence provided clearly indicates that Mr. Davenport on 
April 2, 2002, without approval of Petitioner and without consent of the Court, sold the 2000 
Polaris Scrambler 500 and the Voyager 2-place trailer used to transport the four-wheeler. The 
sale was in the amount of $3500 as represented by exhibit 11. The Court finds that Respondent's 
conduct in selling the four-wheeler and trailer was in violation of the Court's order, placing 
Respondent in contempt of court for such action. 
The funds used to purchase the four-wheeler were obtained by pledging the parties' 
Ford Explorer automobile which was awarded to Petitioner. Respondent obtained $3500 from 
the sale of the four-wheeler and trailer without accounting to Petitioner for the receipt of such 
sums and without applying such amounts on the obligation due on the loan of the Explorer. 
When Petitioner sought to sell the Explorer, the outstanding obligation to secure the funds for the 
four-wheeler remained on that loan, and were paid by Petitioner to satisfy the loan and clear the 
lien. 
The Court finds that Respondent used the $3500 to pay the first mortgage on the home. 
Because Respondent failed to obtain approval of the Court before the selling the four-wheeler; 
because Petitioner's Explorer vehicle was used by the parties to purchase the four-wheeler; 
because Respondent failed to apply the funds of the sale of the four-wheeler and the trailer to the 
outstanding obligation on that loan to decrease the amount of the loan owed and secured by the 
Explorer; because Respondent failed to account to Petitioner for the funds obtained from the sale 
of the four-wheeler and trailer: and because Petitioner, when paying off the obligation against the 
Explorer was required to pay the balance owing, which included the loan to purchase the four-
wheeler, Petitioner is granted judgment against Respondent for the total amount received by him 
for the sale of the four-wheeler and trailer, i.e., $3500. Ordinarily, Petitioner would be entitled to 
one-half of such funds, however, the Court finds that such funds should have been immediately 
applied against the amount owing on Petitioner's Explorer vehicle. 
4. ALIMONY 
Petitioner and Respondent were marred on May 11, 1996. A child was born to the parties 
on October 9, 1996. By way of an order to show cause hearing, Commissioner Patton entered 
the following order: "Petitioner is awarded temporary possession of the home. Respondent will 
maintain the first mortgage on the home in lieu of his cliild support and alimony obligations." On 
June 6, 2003, the parties and counsel appeared before Commissioner Patton with respect to 
Petitioner's Order to Show Cause. The Court finds that prior to the time the parties' appeared 
with counsel and addressed the Commissioner, Mr. Davenport represented to his counsel, who in 
turn, conveyed such information to Petitioner's counsel, that the home had been lost in the 
foreclosure sale. Based upon the information provided to Petitioner, an order was entered as 
follows: " 1. The issue of Mr. Davenport's contempt for failure to pay a monthly mortgage 
payments for the four months in question in 2002 was reserved for hearing before the district 
judge; 2. The issue concerning Petitioner's right for judgment for arrearages for child support and 
alimony was also reserved for trial; 3. Petitioner's motion requesting that Mr. Davenport be 
required to make the payments on the home is now moot, in that the home has been sold in a 
foreclosure sale." The Order was dated July 3, 2003, and signed by the Commissioner and this 
judge. 
The Court finds that Petitioner had attempted on two occasions, one of which is referred 
to above by way of the hearing in June 2003, to obtain information from Respondent concerning 
the financial status of the parties' home, in order that Petitioner might take whatever action was 
necessary to avoid the foreclosure of the home by the lender and thereby losing possession of the 
home as previously awarded her by the Court. At each inquiry by Petitioner of Respondent, Mr. 
Davenport refused to proved the requested information to Petitioner, and in fact misrepresented 
the truth as to the status of the real property. Exhibit 3, a copy of a letter from the bankruptcy 
trustee Daniel Gillman, advised counsel for Petitioner that in February of 2003, the trustee in the 
bankruptcy filed a No Asset Report and abandoned any claim to the real property, thereby leaving 
the property to the action of the lender for the purpose of foreclosure. Also the letter indicates 
that Mr. Davenport had received a discharge in the bankruptcy on April 24, 2003. This 
information was never given to Petitioner or her attorney. 
Because Mr. Davenport failed to inform Petitioner the status of his bankruptcy with 
respect to the real property of the parties, Petitioner lost the opportunity of saving the home from 
foreclosure and lost the opportunity to retain possession of the home and continue to pay for the 
home. From the testimony of Petitioner at the time of trial, and without evidence to the contrary, 
the Court finds that by reason of the wrongful actions of Respondent in allowing the home to be 
foreclosed upon, the parties lost approximately $20,000 in equity. Because Petitioner was forced 
to move from the home when it was foreclosed upon she presently resides with her child at her 
mother's residence. 
The Court farther finds that Respondent misrepresented in his affidavit of May 1, 2003, 
wherein he stated that the foreclosure had already occurred and that the stay had been lifted by 
the bankruptcy court to allow the foreclosure to be completed. Specifically in support of the 
Court's findings with respect to misrepresentation are paragraphs 3 and 4 of Respondent's 
affidavit which states the following: Paragraph 3. "As part of the bankruptcy process, the federal 
court has ordered that my home, located at 774 West 425 North in Lindon be sold at auction." 
Paragraph 4 states "I have had nothing to do with the sale, because it is all part of the bankruptcy 
court, and the federal court still maintains control and jurisdiction over the events concerned with 
my home." Such information was not truthful. 
Inasmuch as the issue of divorce was bifurcated and the parties were divorced prior to the 
time of hearing of the remaining issues on January 27, 2004, the Court finds that Mr. Davenport 
married again on June 4, 2002. Mr. Davenport testified that because of a decrease in his income 
and an increase in expenses due to his new marriage in that he is now responsible to provide 
support for a new wife and her child. Therefore, he voluntarily terminated paying the first 
mortgage on the home for the months of September, October, November and December of 2002 
because he did not have the money available to make the payments. Mr. Davenport's first 
obligation was to obey the orders of the Court, which he chose to disregard. 
Petitioner has requested that she be awarded alimony retroactive to January 2003 to the 
date of this hearing and for a permanent order of alimony in the future. Based upon the evidence 
provided at trial, the Court finds from Petitioner's financial declaration, exhibit 4, that Petitioner's 
monthly gross income is $1800 and her net monthly income is $1731. Petitioner is employed by 
Softwise as an accountant. 
Respondent did not provide the Court a financial declaration but instead provided exhibit 
15, which is entitled "Respondent's Monthly Expenses"; exhibit 12, a copy of the 1999 tax return; 
exhibit 13, a copy of Respondent's 2000 tax return; and exhibit 14, a copy of Respondent's 2001 
tax return. Respondent has relied upon prior declarations of the bankruptcy court to establish his 
gross income to be $2900. Respondent is self-employed as a mortgage broker with a company 
named Premier Mortgage and Capital. Respondent operates his business out of his home. 
Through the course of discovery, Petitioner submitted Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents to Respondent. In that discovery Respondent was asked to provide 
information regarding his gross income in 2003 and to itemize deductions claimed against his 
gross income. Those requests also asked him to state his net monthly pay. Respondent's 
Answers to Interrogatories, signed by him and dated August 20, 2003, are as follows: in 
Interrogatory #1, in response to the question "What is your gross income so far in 2003?" 
Respondent wrote "I do not have my gross income. However, money I have collected is $21,142. 
Business expenses have not been deducted from this figure." When asked to "itemize your 
deductions from your gross pay", Respondent answered "I do not have totals. Please refer to 
previous year's tax returns for estimates." When asked to state his net monthly income, 
Respondent answered "I do not have a set net monthly income. I am self-employed, and every 
month is different." That information was never supplemented as requested by the rules of 
discovery. 
In an effort to provide evidence to support Respondent's claim that his gross monthly 
income is approximately $2900, copies of his tax returns were submitted. In addition, 
Respondent presented exhibit 5, which is a copy of Respondent's "Account Quick Report", 
indicating his monthly gross income for his business as a self-employed individual. Considering 
the evidence presented in exhibit 5 the Court finds that for the months of January 2002 to 
September 2002, the Respondent's average monthly gross income was $1573.03. Furthermore, 
the Court finds that for the period of September 2002 to December 2002, which represents the 
time frame when Respondent voluntarily terminated his payment of the first mortgage, which was 
in lieu of his obligation of child support and alimony, for which he claims that his monthly income 
had decreased and his monthly expenses had increased, the average monthly gross amounts for 
those four months was $4,335.74. The Court has not been provided convincing evidence to 
support Respondent's position as to why he quit paying the first mortgage in lieu of his support 
obligation. To the contrary, the Court finds that the evidence supports a conclusion that 
Respondent's income was significantly higher during the last four months of 2002, then for the 
prior eight months. 
Based upon all the evidence provided, this Court finds that Respondent, without proper 
justification, failed to comply with the Court's order with respect to the payment of the first 
mortgage in lieu of his support obligation. Of that amount, approximately $600 was attributable 
to alimony support. The Court finds Respondent in contempt for failure to pay the first mortgage 
obligation as ordered, and further finds that Respondent's reasons for failure to pay were not 
reasonable, appropriate or supported by the evidence introduced at the time of trial. 
In considering what amount if any Respondent should pay Petitioner for alimony for the 
retroactive time of January 2003 to the time of trial, and what amount, if any, should be paid by 
Respondent to Petitioner for alimony in the future, the Court has considered the factors set forth 
in § 30-3-5(8)(a)(I-vii) UCA. The Court has also considered the language set forth in §30-3-
5(8)(g)(iii)(A), (B), and sub paragraph 8(h), UCA. Considering all of the testimony provided at 
the time of trial, and the Court's consideration of the factors stated in the statute, the Court 
orders that for the time frame of January 2003 to January 2004, Respondent shall pay $600 per 
month as ordered for temporary alimony. The Court finds that Respondent had the financial 
ability during that year's period of time to meet the obligation imposed by the Court for the 
payment of the first mortgage in lieu of Respondent's obligation for child support and alimony. 
The Court does not find that Respondent experienced a decrease in his income, justifying his 
voluntary termination of payment of the support obligation. As to Respondent's claim that his 
expenses increased because of his new marriage and his obligation to provide for his new family, 
the Court has considered, as allowed by the above-referenced statute, the subsequent spouse's 
financial ability to share in the living expenses. 
When questioned at trial as to the income of his new spouse, Donna Davenport, 
Respondent testified that he did not know what his present wife's income was. However, after 
consulting with counsel, he testified he believed it to be approximately $1000 per month. The 
Court finds from the testimony of Donna Davenport that her monthly income, during the time in 
question, was between $1000 and $4000 per month but didn't know for sure what it was. 
However, the Court finds that evidence presented by Petitioner supports a finding that 
Respondent's new spouse then had a gross income of approximately $4800 per month. In fact, 
Donna Davenport testified that her net take home pay is approximately $3000 per month. 
The Court considers the subsequent spouse's income in determining her ability to share in 
the living expenses claimed by Respondent. Respondent claims that his present monthly expenses 
exceed $6700 per month. This Court finds however, that Respondent's spouse has the financial 
ability by reason of her monthly income to assist Respondent in the payment of the shared living 
expenses. 
Because the parties were married for six years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce 
and based upon all the evidence provided at trial with respect to the parties' income and expenses, 
the Court finds that it is reasonable and proper that Respondent pay to Petitioner for alimony the 
sum of $500 per month for 3 years. The Court finds that it is the desire of Petitioner that she and 
her child be able to find a place to reside on their own without the necessity of living with her 
mother. The Court believes that the award of alimony for that period of time together with 
Petitioner's income should be sufficient to allow her to live on her own with her child without 
having to live with her mother, and to make the transition to being self-supporting. 
Respondent's obligation for the payment of alimony shall begin January 1, 2004, for the 
period of three years and shall be paid to Petitioner monthly by Respondent. 
5. CONTEMPT SANCTIONS 
As indicated herein, the Court has found Respondent in contempt for his failure to comply 
with the Court's orders in this case. The Court has also granted judgments against Respondent in 
favor of Petitioner. As to sanctions for Respondent's failure to comply with the orders of the 
Court, Respondent shall serve 30 days in the Utah County Jail. He may purge himself of that 
contempt and avoid those sanctions by paying the full amounts of the judgments as ordered herein 
to Petitioner by April 30, 2004. If such judgments have not been paid in foil, Petitioner may file 
an affidavit in support of an Order to Show Cause asking for the imposition of sanctions against 
Respondent. 
6. ATTORNEY FEES 
Commissioner Patton reserved for trial Petitioner's request for the award of attorney fees. 
Petitioner has also requested that an order be issued by the Court requiring Respondent to pay her 
attorney fees and costs. The Court finds from the affidavit of Petitioner's counsel, as to the 
calculation of attorney fees and costs, that such fees are reasonable and proper in representing 
Petitioner and that Petitioner does not have the financial means available to her to pay attorney 
fees. Therefore, Respondent is ordered to pay attorney fees and costs as set forth in paragraphs 
8, 9, 10 in Mr. McPhie's Affidavit of Attorney Fees. If Respondent objects to the amount of 
costs claimed, that objection must be filed within 20 days of the date of this ruling, and the Court 
will reserve for hearing what amount of costs Respondent shall pay. 
Counsel for Petitioner is directed to prepare the appropriate findings of facts and 
conclusions of law and decree consistent with this Court's decision and submit the same for this 
Court's signature within 30 days of the date of this decision. 
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